Environmental Democratisation in Post-War Colombia by Roa Garcia, Maria Cecilia
www.ssoar.info
Environmental Democratisation in Post-War
Colombia
Roa Garcia, Maria Cecilia
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Roa Garcia, M. C. (2016). Environmental Democratisation in Post-War Colombia. (GIGA Focus Lateinamerika, 5).
Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien,
Institut für Lateinamerika-Studien. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-48184-7
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Focus | LATIN AMERICA         
María Cecilia Roa García, PhD
Humboldt Research Fellow
croa09@gmail.com
GIGA German Institute of Global 
and Area Studies
Leibniz-Institut für Globale  
und Regionale Studien
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21  
20354 Hamburg
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus
María Cecilia Roa García
Environmental Democratisation in  
Post-War Colombia
GIGA Focus | Latin America | Number 5 | September 2016 | ISSN 1862-3573
In 2004 a social movement for environmental democratisation began in 
 Colombia in response to the exponential expansion of extractive activities 
and socio-environmental conflicts driven by policies designed to transform 
Colombia into a mining country. The state’s reaction to this mobilisation 
has been ambiguous, as it depends on the rents of extractive frontiers but is 
also the guarantor of the Constitution and of the rights of its citizens.
 • Colombia is entering a new era in 2016 by signing a peace agreement with the 
FARC rebel movement. After 50 years of violence and millions of people killed 
or displaced, this is an opportunity to end today’s “longest civil war” worldwide. 
 • However, the need to generate revenue to fund the post-war reparation, restitu-
tion, and reintegration programmes and, more generally, to fulfil the demands 
of global markets for minerals, energy, food, and materials puts great pressure 
on the rural areas where the violent conflict has concentrated. 
 • The presence of extractive industries in rural areas of peasant economies and 
ethnic territories has exacerbated previously existing territorial conflicts large-
ly driven by land use. Colombia reports the second-largest number of socio-
environmental conflicts in the global Environmental Justice Atlas, and it ranks 
second in Latin America and third worldwide in the number of assassinations 
of environmental and land activists. 
 • The activation of several democratic-participation mechanisms incorporated 
into the Colombian Constitution of 1991 for environmental issues demonstrates 
the aspiration of marginalised groups to participate in the decision-making 
process regarding territorial planning, the use of resources, and the economic 
model, which all greatly influence socio-environmental conditions.
Policy Implications
Encouraging environmental democratisation is indispensable for achieving 
environmental justice and a transition to peace in Colombia. The international 
community could support this process by promoting higher standards, account-
ability, and participation in environmental decision making; by bolstering the 
Colombian state in its effort to redesign its revenue system from extractive in-
dustries to discourage highly destructive activities; and by promoting the small-
scale, sustainable, rural economies that are at the core of the peace agreement.
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Colombia in Transition to Environmental Peace?
The year 2016 marks a new beginning in the history of Colombia, as the govern-
ment signed an agreement with the FARC to end a period of more than 50 years 
of hostilities. However, the end of the armed conflict could also exacerbate socio-
environmental conflicts that have characterised the long history of extractive activi-
ties. The government relies on the extractive sector to finance the expensive process 
of transitioning to peace. Even before the peace process, the former government 
of Alvaro Uribe (2002–2010) had granted large concessions to private investors 
for oil and mineral exploration and extraction. Additionally, an increasing global 
demand for resources and the belief of private investors that they will have easier 
access to areas previously under the control of FARC are boosting further extrac-
tion. Marginalised communities in rural areas that have been severely affected by 
the armed conflict have cautious expectations about the development model to be 
implemented in their territories in the post-war era. 
Since 2004 communities affected by the arrival of extractive industries have ac-
tivated several mechanisms of democratic participation that were incorporated into 
the Colombian Constitution of 1991. These mechanisms include the referendum, 
the normative initiative, the popular consultation, and the open hearing (cabildo 
abierto). The mechanisms have been called upon in order to protect water sources 
and local economies and to debate alternative visions to extractivism. Communi-
ties want to participate in a meaningful and consequential way in decision making 
about the use of local resources in activities with the potential to impact their liveli-
hoods and their environment. 
Social Metabolism and Extractive Frontiers 
Two concepts can help elucidate the relationship between socio-environmental con-
flicts and the economy. The first, social metabolism, links economic processes to the 
consumption, depletion, and appropriation of natural resources. It refers to the man-
ner in which human societies organise their growing exchanges of energy and materi-
als with the environment (Martinez-Alier 2009). It describes the scale and rates of 
use of resources both for consumptive use and for sinks into which waste resulting 
from transformation processes is deposited. Globally changing patterns of consump-
tion and production, the search for profits of global capital, and a five-fold increase in 
the human population since 1900 have increased social metabolism at unprecedented 
rates (Martínez-Alier et al. 2010). This trend is exacerbating the pressure to extract 
resources from peripheral regions such as Africa and Latin America, which has sig-
nificant socio-economic and environmental implications for these regions (Muradian, 
Walter, and Martinez-Alier 2012). Colombia has seen a significant rise in the amount 
of materials exported since 1985 in comparison with the materials it has imported. 
The export of oil, coal, ferronickel, gold, biofuels, and other materials exceeds imports 
by a factor of no less than three (Pérez-Rincón 2014). Despite the great physical-trade 
imbalance, Colombia and other countries in the region are not able to pay for their 
imports. The commercial deficit further intensifies the social metabolism as commer-
cial deficits have to be compensated for by further extraction, foreign investments, or 
bank loans, which in due course will produce repayments to foreign countries.
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This brings us to the second useful concept, the “commodities frontier” (Moore 
2015). Commodities or extractive frontiers are the territories on which capitalism 
depends as the providers of resources (food, raw materials, energy, and labour) to 
be transformed and commoditised. The capitalist system has always depended on a 
less-developed exterior, or frontiers, to supply these goods and services. As Moore 
explains, since the sixteenth century there have been world movements of appro-
priation from frontier zones of low or minimal commodification. The intensification 
of the social metabolism implies the expansion of extractive frontiers to new terri-
tories. The economy of rich countries or regions is so dependent on inputs of energy 
and materials that, even without economic growth, the pressure is bound to rise on 
the extractive frontiers from which these inputs derive (Martínez-Alier et al. 2010). 
The continuous expansion of extractive frontiers is leading towards the exhaustion 
of cheap resources and moving into territories that are ecologically vulnerable and 
inhabited by indigenous people or disadvantaged social groups, thereby setting the 
conditions for the emergence of new conflicts over resource extraction (Muradian 
et al. 2012; Martínez-Alier and Walter 2016). Local inhabitants increasingly resist 
extraction because of the more severe environmental impacts that are exacerbated 
by the decline in the quality of mineral reserves, the need to access fuels through 
unconventional methods of unknown impacts such as fracking, and the violence 
involved in the appropriation of resources for all kinds of extraction. These growing 
socio-ecological tensions are gaining geopolitical and geo-economic significance. 
It could be said that one distinct feature of the current crisis of capitalism is that 
the extractive frontiers on which the global economy has historically depended are 
becoming smaller, more costly, and more problematic.
Socio-environmental Conflicts and Violence in Colombia
In this context, it is not surprising that the world is experiencing an increase in 
environment-related conflicts, particularly in regions with ecologically vulnerable 
ecosystems, an intensive human occupation of territory, and high levels of social 
organisation. With 121 cases, Colombia reports the second-largest number of socio-
environmental conflicts in the Environmental Justice Atlas, as shown in Figure 1, 
and it is ranked third globally, after Brazil and the Philippines, on the list of coun-
tries with the largest number of assassinations of environmental activists (Global 
Witness, 2016). The database on social struggles from the Centro de Investigación 
y Educación Popular (CINEP) for the period from 2001 to 2011 registered 274 col-
lective social actions associated with oil, coal, and gold extraction, a notable in-
crease since 2005 (CINEP 2012). Based on the cases reported in the Environmental 
Just ice Atlas (EJATLAS 2016), Pérez-Rincón (2014) shows that up to 2001 there 
had been 19 visible environmental conflicts in the country. From 2002 to 2010, 
corres ponding to Alvaro Uribe’s two terms in office, 47 conflicts began. During the 
first Santos government, six additional conflicts were reported. Of the 72 conflicts, 
61 per cent were related to mining or fossil energy.
The increasing number of conflicts is associated with an exponential expansion 
of extractive activities in recent years, as a consequence of changes in the regulatory 
framework intended to transform the Colombian economy into a mining economy. 
This has been carried out primarily by facilitating foreign investments in extractive 
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industries. Changes started in the 1980s under the Ernesto Samper government, 
which drafted a new mining code under the consultation of and with funding from the 
Canadian government, as Canadian corporations are major global players in mining 
operations. The mining code approved in 2001 under Alvaro Uribe drastic ally cut the 
royalties to be paid to the Colombian government as an incentive for foreign invest-
ment. During the eight years of Uribe’s government, there were even greater incen-
tives for foreign investment through tax reductions or exemptions, labour flexibilisa-
tion, and the loosening of environmental standards (Pérez-Rincón 2014). The politics 
of “investment confidence” of Uribe’s government has been followed since 2010 by 
the “mining development engine” of Santos’s two terms. Not only has his government 
maintained the incentives for foreign investment in the extractive sector, but it also 
Figure 1.  
Location and Types of 
Socio-environmental 
Conflicts in Colombia
Source: EJATLAS 2016.
 
1
   5    GIGA FOCUS | LATIN AMERICA | NO. 5 | SEPTEMBER 2016 
has a great deal of confidence in this sector providing at least some of the estimated 
USD 45 billion that it will cost to implement a guerrilla-demobilisation process.
The results of these policies are reflected in a significant expansion of new for-
eign direct investment (FDI), as shown in Figure 2, which since 2014 has only de-
clined, as a result of decreasing international commodity prices. 
Colombia’s total exports grew from 6.72 billion USD in 1990 to 35.69 billion USD 
in 2015 (DANE 2016). Currently, 59 per cent of total exports correspond to oil and 
coal, while 5 per cent correspond to gold. However, the Colombian state, whose 
nominal income-tax rates and level of royalties are among the highest in Latin 
America, ranks among the lowest in terms of tax revenues per unit of value added 
by the mining and hydrocarbons sector. In the last two decades, for every dollar 
contributed to GDP by mining and hydrocarbons, the state received revenue of less 
than 16 cents (Rudas Lleras and Espitia Zamora 2013).
The favourable conditions for foreign investors in extractive activities have led 
to an increase in mining and oil titles and concessions. The number of mining titles 
granted in Colombia grew from 2,965 in 2002 to 9,131 in 2012. Of these titles, 61 per 
cent are for exploration and 39 per cent for extraction, and they cover a total of 4.4 per 
cent of the national territory. Similarly, the National Agency of Hydrocarbons, created 
in 2004 to promote oil exploration and extraction, has granted concessions of over 
20.9 million hectares for exploration and has a further 54.5 million hectares available 
for prospective investors, including large offshore areas. 
With such an expansion of the Colombian extractive frontier, it is difficult to 
avoid overlapping with territories of indigenous, black, and peasant communities, 
strategic areas for the provision of water and ecosystems of natural importance 
and cultural identity. Of the 72 environmental conflicts analysed by Pérez-Rincón 
(2014), 19 (26 per cent) are within areas of environmental conservation (e.g. na-
tional parks, protected areas, or páramos [1]), with the same number of conflicts 
within ethnic territories. The large extractive projects in indigenous territories are 
the major contributors to 64 indigenous groups being at risk of extinction (AB-
Colombia et al. 2012). 
It has been recognised that extractive activities exacerbate physical violence 
in Colombia’s various territories in different ways. The presence of military forces 
is more pronounced in resource-rich areas; they are deployed to protect the infra-
structure of extractive projects and to control social opposition to extraction. Ex-
traction activities in areas such as coal, ferronickel, gold, and oil, as well as several 
agricultural products such as bananas and palm oil, are in many cases behind acts of 
Figure 2.  
Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in Colombia 
(2000–2015)
Source: Banco de la 
República 2016.
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violence perpetrated by illegal actors such as paramilitary forces with the intent of 
gaining or maintaining social and political control over territories (COHDES 2014). 
To date, some six million people have been forcibly displaced and at least eight 
million hectares of land (some 14 per cent of Colombia’s territory) abandoned or 
forcibly appropriated as a result of the internal conflict. Some of those who have 
been forced to flee had been targeted as part of a deliberate policy to remove people 
from areas rich in natural resources. As early as 2000, UN rapporteur Francis Deng 
had identified displacement as a tool used not only by large landowners and narco-
traffickers to acquire land, but also by private enterprises planning large-scale pro-
jects for the exploitation of natural resources and the implementation of large-scale 
development projects, in some cases concerning not only domestic economic inter-
ests but also the objectives of multinational corporations. It is thus not mere coin-
cidence that the areas where guerrilla and paramilitary activity is most intense tend 
to be rich in natural resources. Amnesty International has documented numerous 
cases of community members having been threatened, forcibly displaced, or killed 
for their attempts to oppose outside mining interests, defend artisanal mining, and 
claim territorial rights (Amnesty International 2015).  
This overview of the complex relationship between nature and society in Co-
lombia points to one possible paradox of the coming decades in the aftermath of 
the peace agreement: as long as the government facilitates the further expansion of 
the extractive frontier, socio-environmental conflicts will intensify. This does pose 
a great threat, given that 41 of the 47 Colombian municipalities highly prioritised by 
the United Nations in the post–peace agreement stage have large areas of natural 
parks and forest reserves, some of whose entire area falls into those categories. Ad-
ditionally, mining titles have been granted in more than 80 per cent of the munici-
palities that have been recently (since 2010) affected by the conflict with the FARC, 
with some municipalities having more than 40 per cent of their territories granted 
in mining concessions (UNDP 2014).
Claiming Environmental Democratisation 
In this context, communities around the country have organised resistance with 
multiple strategies and in some cases have been able to delay, suspend, or stop 
extractive projects. Some communities have activated participation mechanisms 
that were incorporated into the Constitution of 1991, in order to collectively decide 
whether they want to allow extractive activities into their territories or to protect 
water sources, soils, landscapes, and their traditional livelihoods. 
The push for environmental democratisation started in 2004 when, as a result 
of two open hearings, the municipality of Cerrito in the Department of Santander 
suspended all mining activities on its territory through a bylaw. Since then, the com-
munity has also participated in discussions on territorial-planning schemes and has 
had direct verbal confrontations with guerrilla and paramilitary groups that have 
come to the area at various times stressing the desirability of exploiting coal in the 
páramo area. Moreover, in August 2010, the municipal council unanimously ap-
proved a popular normative initiative presented by the committee for the defence of 
the Almorzadero páramo. Under this initiative, mining is prohibited within pára-
mos as they are considered fragile ecosystems essential to the water cycle. 
   7    GIGA FOCUS | LATIN AMERICA | NO. 5 | SEPTEMBER 2016 
Popular normative initiatives are a mechanism by which citizens promote the 
adoption of laws or regulations of lower rank. The proponents play an important 
role in the procedure, because they participate in all of the discussion sessions re-
lated to the initiative. According to the Electoral Observation Mission, between 
1991 and 2012 four agreements came before municipal or district councils, of which 
only one was approved: the declaration of the Almorzadero páramo as an area ex-
cluded from mining.
Starting in 2007, a diverse group of activists supported by an international net-
work for water justice proposed asking citizens whether they agreed on incorporat-
ing into the Constitution five principles related to water as a common good. This 
was done under the mechanism of a referendum through which people approve 
or reject a draft legal rule, or revoke one that is in place. The campaign for the ref-
erendum was initiated in February 2007 and completed in September 2008 with 
the acceptance of more than two million signatures. Yet, when the proposed text 
went to Congress for debate, the legislature modified or deleted many of its compo-
nents, and the intent behind the original text was completely distorted. After a long 
struggle to restore the referendum’s manifesto to its original version, in May 2010 
the low participation of chamber members did not allow the required half-plus-one 
majority to be reached. This defeat abruptly interrupted a process of more than two 
years in duration, arguably the largest social-mobilisation initiative the country had 
ever seen. 
In 2010 a popular movement arising from Santander and Norte de Santander 
promoted the implementation of two popular consultations to protect the Berlin and 
Santurbán páramos. These páramos together provide water to more than two million 
inhabitants in 72 municipalities and are at the core of a dispute with the Canadian 
Eco Oro Minerals Corporation, the company formerly known as Grey Star, which had 
originally obtained the mining rights. This company plans to operate a gold mine and 
has already invested more than USD 150 million to that end, some of which was pro-
vided by international financial institutions. Until 2011 Grey Star had been planning 
an open-pit gold mine, but because of massive demonstrations, and given the Minis-
try of Environment’s refusal to grant a licence to the project in the Santurbán páramo, 
the renamed corporation is now planning to operate a tunnel mine. A constitutional 
judicial review declared that holding the popular consultation was feasible, though 
only for Norte de Santander, and scheduled it for October 2011. However, despite all 
requirements having been met, the National Electoral Commission and the National 
Civil Registry still did not implement the procedure. They argued that the electoral 
kits for the local elections had already been delivered without the consultation ballots, 
and that it would thus be logistically impossible to arrange for the extra ballot cards 
to be sent (MOE 2012).
In 2013 two popular consultations took place in the municipalities of Piedras 
and Tauramena expressing an overwhelming opposition to extractive projects. In 
July 2013 the municipality of Piedras, Tolima – whose economy is based on agricul-
ture and livestock – conducted the first popular consultation targeting an extractive 
project to protect the municipality and the Opia River from the development of a 
mining district which was envisaged to be one of the ten largest open-pit mines in 
the world, a project called La Colosa. It was to be operated by AngloGold  Ashanti 
(AGA), the world’s third-largest gold producer. The alliance between peasants, 
large landowners, and municipal institutions together with the support of environ-
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mental committees, students, and legal advisors activated the popular consultation 
mechanism.
Five and a half months later, in December 2013 in the town of Tauramena, 
Casanare, a second popular consultation was held in response to plans by the Co-
lombian company Ecopetrol to implement the seismic exploration project Odys-
sey 3D in six municipalities in Casanare, with Tauramena representing 52 per cent 
of the affected area. The community was concerned about the possible effects that 
seismic exploration could have on water sources. 
The Piedras and Tauramena consultations were validated as they both exceeded 
the mandatory minimum requirement that one-third of the total registered-voter 
population in fact cast a vote in the consultation; the citizens’ decision to protect 
the territories in question was almost unanimous. These two bottom-up movements 
of environmental democratisation generated a multifaceted reaction on the part of 
the national government, which after the successful consultation in Piedras tried to 
prevent the consultation in Tauramena. 
Following the lead of Piedras, the municipality of Cajamarca – where the gold 
reserves of La Colosa are located – has been discussing the possibility of calling 
a popular consultation through public hearings amidst fierce opposition from the 
mining company. In August 2016, with continued social mobilisation, the munici-
pal council approved the popular consultation whose question will be evaluated by 
the administrative tribunal of Tolima. In February 2016 the city council of Ibague, 
the capital city of the Department of Tolima, located in La Colosa’s area of influ-
ence, approved the implementation of a popular consultation promoted by local 
environmental organisations. After months of significant political pressure on the 
administrative tribunal of Tolima, the consultation was approved; it is scheduled 
for October 2016.
Several other attempts to carry out popular consultations at the municipal level 
were blocked. For example, in the municipalities of Pueblorrico and Pijao, the con-
sultations had already been endorsed by mayors and city councils. However, the 
administrative courts of Antioquia and Quindío blocked consultations in their re-
spective municipalities, arguing the latter’s lack of competence. Pueblorrico opted 
for autonomous popular legislative instruments such as popular mandates, which, 
so far, have kept mining activities off of municipal territory; Pijao filed a tutela [2] 
which was rejected twice by the State Council and subsequently selected for review 
by the Constitutional Court, though no ruling has yet been made.
However, not all state institutions opposed the consultations. The State 
Council, [3] for example, has suspended governmental decrees that were intended 
to undermine the autonomy of municipalities to decide how to use their own terri-
tories (Decree 934 of 2013) or to participate in a just and informed manner (Decree 
2691 of 2014). Furthermore, the Ministry of the Interior drafted Law 1757 in 2015, 
which facilitates the use of participation mechanisms by skipping the requirement 
for approval by the city council if a community can collect the signatures of 20 per 
cent or more of the electorate.
More recently, and in line with the State Council, in May 2016 the Constitu-
tional Court ruled on the unconstitutionality of Article 37 of the mining code, which 
prevented territorial authorities from prohibiting mining. In June 2016 the Con-
stitutional Court made yet another significant decision, this time responding to a 
 tutela for the protection of ethnic minorities’ rights to consultation and to terri-
2 A tutela is a legal  
action for the protection  
of constitutional rights.
3 The Council of State  
of Colombia is an admin-
istrative litigation court 
and advisory body to the 
government. One of its 
functions is to hear actions 
of nullity for the unconstitu-
tionality of decrees issued 
by the national govern-
ment.
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tories that were being violated by the establishment of so-called “strategic mining 
areas.” In February 2016 the Constitutional Court also ruled in favour of the protec-
tion of the fundamental right to water by declaring mining activities in páramos 
unconstitutional.
Environmental Democratisation, Environmental Peace,  
and Nature–Society Relations
These developments reveal an environmental democratisation already in motion in 
extractive frontiers, the appropriation of the right to participation by affected com-
munities, and a growing societal aspiration towards environmental democratisa-
tion. The activities of local movements in extractive frontiers resonated in the wider 
regions, inspiring other local movements and even, in the case of the water refer-
endum, a national mobilisation. The state has used strategies to block the mecha-
nisms, sometimes successfully, but it has not been able to defeat the overwhelming 
demand of communities to have access to meaningful and consequential ways of 
participating in decisions affecting water, territories, and livelihoods. 
The social movements for environmental democratisation are disseminating 
several messages. One clear message for the near future is that there will not be peace 
in the territories without environmental peace. Opening up the extractive frontiers 
further to heighten the social metabolism at the expense of local livelihoods, land-
scapes, water sources, and rural identities will transform but not reduce the conflict. 
Building roads, waterways, and large hydroelectric dams in order to facilitate the 
extraction of minerals, fuels, and biomass from territories that have had limited ex-
posure to the state means at least two things: first, it means disregarding historical 
factors that have fuelled the internal conflict; second, it means continuing along the 
unsustainable path of extractive development, with its destructive capacity and its 
patterns of injustice and violence vis-à-vis individuals, communities, and nature. 
The concession of mining and oil exploration titles in fragile ecosystems in pro-
tected areas, water-scarce regions, and territories of ethnic and peasant commu-
nities – which characterises the municipalities that have been prioritised for the 
post-war era – makes it absolutely necessary to develop an entirely new approach 
to development in these territories. The state’s vision of doubling coal production, 
quadrupling gold exports, and tripling the mining area between 2011 and 2021 (AB-
Colombia et al. 2015) clearly disregards local and global socio-environmental con-
cerns and ignores the contribution of extractive activities to the internal conflict. 
In the context of the peace process, new proposals point towards economic al-
ternatives around food production, eco-tourism, bioprospecting, and payment for 
environmental services (UNDP 2014). But any alternative should be vetted and well 
considered, lest it become just a different way of appropriating nature, as some of 
these proposals already fall within the logic of investment opportunities for global 
capital accumulation, financialisation, and rent seeking.
The activation of democratic mechanisms for the environment is also a call to 
pay attention to the current conjuncture of pressing global trends. These trends in-
clude climate change, with its effects on food production and health, and the grow-
ing number of people for whom the capitalist system will not keep its promise of 
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inclusion through productive and fairly compensated labour. In light of this, for 
six million Colombians who were displaced to the margins of urban areas, there is 
an urgent need for restitution of the usurped land. This restitution needs to focus 
on legal titles to land and the recognition of water as a common good that is inte-
gral to territories and defines the identities of ethnic and peasant communities. 
Small-scale, labour-intensive, and requiring little energy use, peasant agriculture is 
significantly more sustainable than large-scale commercial agriculture, one of the 
largest contributors to greenhouse gases and climate change. 
It has been argued that the current ecological crisis is a result of a global system 
based on the separation of society from nature. The view of nature as an external 
object at the service of society has facilitated its appropriation, commodification, and 
exhaustion. The frontier is explicit in the ownership of the subsoil by developmental-
ist nation-states. By defining minerals and fuels as strategic resources for the bene-
fit of all citizens, nation-states become intermediaries between society and nature 
in deciding who, where, and how these resources are extracted. The environmental 
democratisation movement represents a strategy to transcend this nature–society 
divide. By abandoning the “society plus nature” binary model, the questions asked 
in consultations, referendums, and popular initiatives in Colombia surround how we 
want to be collectively configured in the web of life (Moore 2015). With the unprece-
dented global inequality of cultural, political, and economic power within and across 
geographical scales, these fundamental forms of democratisation are imperative.
Allowing, defending, and encouraging societal participation in environmental 
and territorial decision making in the context of the transition to peace represents a 
transformation of environmental conflicts into scenarios of democratisation. The use 
of participation mechanisms rejects the language that tends to depoliticise and convert 
political issues into technical and scientific decisions (Swyngedouw 2010). The last 
three rulings of the Constitutional Court, putting a halt to the unilateral decision of the 
central government regarding mining activities, could be interpreted as an attempt to 
put the brakes on the economic model based on extractive activ ities. These rulings can 
also be regarded as the response of the Constitutional Court to the broad aspiration – 
emanating from a wide range of communities – to recover political  spaces of debate 
and decision making. This is exactly what a transition to peace entails. 
Environmental democratisation is a process already in motion as a response 
from communities to the violence that has been fuelled by extractivism. This pro-
cess, together with other mechanisms of social participation in decision making at 
the local level, highlights the relevance of environmental issues and is indispens-
able for environmental justice and peace in Colombia.
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